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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CERTIORARI-INTEGRITY OF THE RULE OF FOUR-

In four recent cases involving the Federal Employers Liability Act1 the
Supreme Court of the United States, after granting certiorari, reviewed
the facts of the cases to determine if there was sufficient evidence to allow
the cases to be heard by a jury.2 Justice Frankfurter in a lengthy dissent-

135 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51 to 60.
Rogers v. Missouri, 352 U.S. 500 (1957}; Webb v. Illinois R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957);
Herdman v. Pennsylvania R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957); Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
352 U.S. 521 (1957).
2
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ing opinion refused to hear these cases on their merits. 3 He would have dismissed them on the ground that certiorari was improvidently granted, although no new evidence warranted this conclusion. Justice Frankfurter
maintained that any justice has a right to refuse to hear a case after
certiorari has been granted, and that the rule of four is not inflexible,
particularly when a class of cases is systematically taken for review.
An appeal on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States
was originally available to all unsuccessful litigants in the federal courts,
and to all those in state courts if a federal question was involved.4 However, since 1891, when circuit courts of appeals were established, the Supreme Court has been allowed an increasing amount of discretion as to
which cases it will review. 5 Circuit court decisions were made final in
cases of several types in 1911 6 and 1916.7 Finally, in the Judiciary Act of
1925 circuit court decisions were made final in almost all cases, and, in
general, a writ of error from lower federal courts to the Supreme Court
was not available. 8 During this period also the number of cases entitled
to a writ of error from state courts was drastically cut.9 The writ of certiorari has thus become the principal means for obtaining review by the
Supreme Court.10 The granting of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary
act by the Court, 11 and is without control from any source. On occasions
when the Court's certiorari policy was being debated, members of
the Supreme Court have testified to Congress, however, that a selfimposed safeguard was present to prevent unduly limiting access to the

3 Principal case at 524-558. The opinion contains a listing of all cases since 1911 in
which the Supreme Court considered the sufficiency of the evidence in cases involving
the FELA.
41 Stat. 81 (1789) gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over circuit courts,
and I Stat. 85 (1789) provides a writ of error from decisions of the highest court of the
various states.
5 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Certiorari was provided for decisions otherwise final. However,
a writ of error to the Supreme Court was still available for cases involving capital
crimes, prizes, conflict of state laws and constitutions with the United States Constitution,
constitutional issues, or construction of federal statutes.
6 36 Stat. 1133 (1911) provided that circuit court opinions were final in all diversity
cases, and cases involving patents, copyrights, revenue laws, criminal laws, and admiralty
questions.
7 39 Stat. 726 (1916). Circuit court decisions were made final in all cases involving
bankruptcy, Federal Employers' Liability Act, and the Safety Appliance Act.
8 43 Stat. 936 (1925). This is essentially the present act. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1254, 1257.
9 39 Stat. 726 (1916).
10 See official statement showing number of cases filed, disposed of, and remaining
on dockets at conclusion of October Terms 1946, 1947, and 1948 appearing at 337 U.S.
963 (1949). See also, Harper and Rosenthal, "What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in
the 1949 Term," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 293 (1950); and similar articles covering the 1950,
1951 and 1952 terms in the Supreme Court: 100 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 354 (1951); IOI UNIV.
PA. L. REV. 439 (1953); 102 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 427 (1954).
11 See Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV, 1957) §2071. Rule 19 begins: "A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion. •
"
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Court. 12 This safeguard is the rule of four.1 8 This rule allows a minority
of four justices to decide if a particular case is worth being heard on its
merits by the Court as a whole. The rule is generally recognized as an established practice of the court.14 On rare occasions, after granting certiorari
and hearing argument, the Court will decide that on the basis of new or
undisclosed evidence the ·writ of certiorari was improvidently granted, and
will dismiss the case without deciding it on its merits.15 In the principal
cases, Justice Frankfurter does not argue that there is any new evidence
present, but states that these cases should not be heard on the merits because certiorari should never have been granted in the first place. Justice
Frankfurter argues that "not four, not eight, Justices can require another
to decide a case that he regards as not properly before the Court."16 He
considers the right to dissent paramount, but would respect the rule of
four when individual cases were involved. He feels, however, that the
rule has no meaning when a class of cases is given what he considers to be
a favored 'position. Justice Frankfurter feels strongly that cases involving
the Federal Employers Liability Act, on questions of sufficiency of the
evidence to send the case to a jury, have no place in the business of the
Supreme Court, 17 and refuses to hear them on their merits. It seems clear
that the position of Justice Frankfurter serves to annul the effect of the
rule of four and is thus contrary to the established practice of the Court.

12 Justice Van Devanter testified before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate on S. 2060 and 2061, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 29 (1924), and explained
the certiorari policy of the Court as follows, "For instance, if there were five votes against
granting the petition and four in favor of granting it, it would be granted, because we
proceed upon the theory that when as many as four members of ~he court, and even
three in some instances, are impressed with propriety of our taking the case the petition
should be granted." Justices Van Devanter and Brandeis testified before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2176, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 9-10 (1924), and explained
the rule of four at that time also. In addition, during the debate on President Roosevelt's
plan to increase the size of the judiciary, the certiorari policy of the Court was discussed
at length. The rule of four was cited to answer critics who complained about the small
number of writs which were granted. See Letter of Chief Justice Hughes to Senator
Wheeler, March 23, 1937, and debate involving this letter printed in 81 CONG. REc. 2813
(1937).
18 For discussion of the rule, see STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
2d ed., 145 (1954); WOLFSON AND KURLAND, ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES §314 (1951).
14 Chief Justice Stone in Bailey v. Central Vermont R., 319 U.S. 350 at 359 (1943),
said, "But as we have adhered to our long standing practice of granting certiorari upon
the affirmative vote of four Justices, the case is properly here for decision and is, I
think, correctly decided." See also dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in United
States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 at 298 (1951); Burton, "Judging Is Also Administration,"
33 A.B.A.J. 1099 at ll64 (1947); 21 TEMP. L. Q. 77 at 84 (1947); Boskey, "Mechanics of
the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction," 46 CoL. L. REv. 255 at 257 (1946).
15 See STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 2d ed., 158 (1954).
16 Principal case at 528.
17 Id. at 525-539. For more examples of Justice Frankfurter's views on this subject
see particularly his dissenting opinon in Carter v. Atlantic & St. Andrews Bay R. Co.,
338 U.S. 430 (1949), and his concurring opinion in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53
(1948).
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Seven of the present justices of the Court expressed disapproval of Justice
Frankfurter's position on this question. Speaking through Justice Harlan,
they stated that it is in respect to classes of cases where established cleavages
of the judges are likely to arise that the rule of four becomes most important.18 The rule of four is not a rule laid down by Congress, but is a
working rule of the Supreme Court itself. Determining whether a particular case involves issues important enough to warrant a hearing by the full
Court is one of the most subjective decisions which a justice can make.
The rule of four basically involves respecting the value judgments of fellow justices. If four justices believe an issue is of such importance that
it should be decided by the Court, a due regard for the rule and for the
other justices then appears to require each justice not only to decide the
case on its merits, but also to attempt to reappraise his own position as to
the value of the issue involved. If five justices followed the position of
Justice Frankfurter, the rule of four would become meaningless, and a
majority would control. The rule is important in that it allows greater
flexibility in the types of cases which the Court will review. The existence
and integrity of the rule of four demand that each justice decide all cases
in which certiorari is granted on its merits.
Robert L. Knauss, S. Ed.

18 Principal case at 561-562. See also Justice •Douglas' comments on the "integrity of
the rule of four" in his dissent in United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 at 298 (1951).

